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1. INTRODUCTION 
Each year, Inany young people graduate from college and enter the 
job market with a lot of  ambitions, high expectations, and an eager- 
ness to succeed. For an organization, they form an important pool of 
potential employees. However, turnover during the initial employ- 
ment period is known to be high. de Pascale and Lange (1971) report 
that over 50 percent of  all American MBA's leave their first emplo- 
yer within five years. Similarly, Sonnenfield, Peiperl and Kotter (1988) 
find that a majority of Harvard MBA's work for more than two orga- 
nizations in their first ten years after graduation. In Flanders, 33 per- 
cent leave their first employer, while 20 percent has already worked 
for three or four organizations, within two years after graduation (De 
Personeelsgids (1991)). 
This high turnover during the initial employment period bears im- 
plications for both parties involved. From an individual perspective, 
the early years on one's first job can be difficult. Young graduates of- 
ten have unrealistic job expectations, may experience ambiguity about 
the criteria by which their performance will be evaluated, or may be 
unaware of the organization's political aspects. Because of these and 
other reasons, the initial employment period is often characterized 
by frustration and dissatisfaction leading to a high turnover rate. MOI-e- 
over, events in the early stages of one's career have been found to be 
important determinants of socio-economic attainment in subsequent 
stages (see e.g. Shavit, Matras and Featherman (1990)), which amp- 
lifies the implications of  the phenomenon. From an organizational 
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come very costly. Besides the obvious costs of  recruitment and trai- 
ning, organizations may be confronted with a low morale of the other 
employees, interruption of the work flow, and damage to their repu- 
tation.  For thein, it is iil~poliallt  to monitor turnover rates and to take 
corrective action when the implications of turnover become excessi- 
ve. 
The development of strategies for dealing with turnover rates de- 
pends on the level of  understanding of the issue under investigation. 
However, this understanding may be biased by the methodology used 
in most research and by an excessive reliance on U.S. data. As to the 
methodology, we use the flexible hazard-rate specification develo- 
ped in Vanhuele, Dekimpe, Sharma and Morrison (1995). Unlike re- 
gression models (where the dependent variable is the observed length 
of stay with the company) or logitlprobit models (where one defines 
a zero-one variable to indicate who has left the company by the end 
of the observation period), the hazard function is our construct of main 
interest. This function measures the conditional probability of  lea- 
ving the company in a given time period t,  given that one has not yet 
done so by the end of period t-l.  As explained in more detail below, 
the hazard formulation used in this paper has the following appea- 
ling features: (1) it allows for right-censored data (i.e. some people 
may still be on their first job at the end of the observation period, and 
their true duration will only be known in the future); (2) it incorpo- 
rates industry-specific, firm-specific and individual-level characteris- 
tics, which have been suggested in previous research as potential mo- 
derators of one's propensity to quit; (3) it measures the impact of ten- 
ure in a non-parametric way, and thereby allows for non-monotonic 
patterns in the relationship between an individual's quitting proba- 
bility and hislher length of stay with the organization, and (4) it cor- 
rects for the fact that our model does not yet incorporate all poten- 
tially relevant factors such as the amount of extra-legal benefits. While 
previous studies have already examined predictors and reasons for lea- 
ving an organization (e.g. Terborg and Lee (1984); Cotton and Tuttle 
(1986); Lewis and Park (1989); Petersen and Spilerman (1990); Stroh, 
Brett and Reilly (1993)), their methodology did not incorporate all 
aforementioned properties. Still, each property is important to make 
reliable and inanagerially useful inferences from the data at hand. Se- 
cond, most research on turnover has been coilducted in the U.S. Re- 
cently, the need to assess the appropriateness of  transferring theo- ries developed in the U.S. to other countries has been emphasized. 
Given thc growing awareness of  the cultural relativity of rnocieril or- 
ganization theories, testing prevailing theories on non-U.S. data is in- 
creasingly  encouraged  (see  e.g.  Berry  (1989);  Boyacigiller  and 
Adler (1991); Hostede (1983)). 
Thus far, little empirical research has been conducted 011  the job 
mobility of university graduates in Flanders. A rich data set has been 
made available to us by Krnntengi.oep De Stnndnar-d, on the basis of 
which we assess the following issues: 
-  How long do Flemish graduates, on average, stay with their first em- 
ployer, and when are they most likely to quit? 
-  Are female graduates more or less likely to switch jobs in an early 
stage of their career? 
-  What career motives are valued most by early movers, extrinsic (such 
as salay) or intrinsic (such as autonomy)? 
-  Do small firms have a competitive disadvantage compared to lar- 
ger firms because of a lack of promotion possibilities, or does their 
more entrepreneurial character encourage commitment? 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. In Section 11, 
we formulate our hypotheses with respect to the impact of tenure, edu- 
cation, gender, geographical preference, career values, salary and size 
of  the organization on a graduate's quitting probability. Section 111 
describes our data, and Section IV discusses briefly the adopted mo- 
deling approach. Empirical results are presented in Section V.  Sec- 
tion VI summarizes our main conclusions. 
II. ANTECEDENTS OF TURNOVER' 
The relationship between an individual's length of stay with thc orga- 
nization (hislher tenure) and the probability of  quitting has been the 
subject of much research intei-est.  Terborg and Lee (1984) found a ne- 
gative relationship between the time in an e~nployee's  present job and 
the turnover rate. implying that the loilgzr someone has been wi~h  the 
company, the lower hislher propensity to quit. Based on a meta ana- 
lysis of previous studies, Cotton and Tuttle (1986) also reported a 
highly significant negative relationship between tenure and turnover. 
An underlying reason for this relationship is that tenure is a proxy for 
the amount of firm-specific  training or specialization which presuma- bly is of less value to other firms (Blossfeld and Hamerle (1990); Mincer 
(19741, Mobley (1982)). Also, the loiiger an individual has  with 
a particular organization, the more helshe may become emotionally 
attached to it and perceive a congruence between hislher goals and 
those of  the organization (Huselid and Day (1991)). 
Alternatively, Blossfeld and Hamerle (1990) report a positive du- 
ration dependence at the individual level after controlling for unob- 
served heterogeneity (see Section IV for a discussion on this issue). 
In other vdords, they find that einployces become more likely to quit 
as they have spent more time in their current job. 
Third, one could hypothesize a non-monotonic relationship bet- 
ween tenure and turnover. Indeed, young graduates inay accept the 
first job offer they get and use that job to look in a more relaxed way 
(since they are no longer unemployed) for their "ideal job". Because 
of this "job shopping", one may see an increasizg quitticg probability 
during the first monthslyears after graduation.  Also, new entrants into 
the labor market face significant occupation- and job-specific un- 
certainty (McCall (1990)), and may start their first job with unrealis- 
tic expectations. Again, this may cause the quitting probability to in- 
crease during the first months or years. However, if they "stick around 
for some time, the congruence with the organization may eventually 
increase, their firm-specific training may start to accumulate, and their 
quitting probability may, past a critical duration, start to decrease. 
Such a non-monotonic pattern was found by McCall(1990), who con- 
cluded that models which only allow for lnonotonically increasing or 
decreasing relationships between turnover and tenure may not be ap- 
propriate. 
Oiir first liypoiliesis is therifore that a graduate's quitting proba- 
bility will be affected by hislher length of stay on the job. However, 
the nature of  this relationship is not clear a priori. As such, we will 
model the relationship non-parametrically, which offers us enough 
flexibility to also capture non-monotonic and even multi-modal pat- 
terns. 
PTypothesis l:  The probability of  quitting the first job  will be related to 
the elapsed time irz  that job. B. Education 
According to human capital theory, workers make rational choices re- 
garding investments in their own human capital (Becker (1975)), in- 
cluding education, interruptions in labor force participation and com- 
pany changes. Other things being equal, managers with greater hu- 
man capital may be more likely to exit their organizations than mana- 
gers with less human capital. The primary indicator of human capital, 
education, is generally found to be positively correlated with turn- 
over (Cotton and Tuttle (1986); Terborg and Lee (1984)). Organiza- 
tions, on the one hand, may use education as an indicator of  ability 
and consider managers with higher levels of education more easily re- 
employable than those with less education. Managers, on the other 
hand, may change companies as a way to increase their human capi- 
tal by obtaining breath of experience. For example. career handbooks 
(e.g. Gerberg (1980); Hirsch (1987)) advise people to change organi- 
zations if they desire substantial salary changes. This advice seems pre- 
dicated on the belief that only in the external labor market will one 
obtain one's full value. Skills are presumably insufficiently rewarded 
by the employing organization in the absence of  competitive market 
forces. 
Hypothesis 2: Education will be negatively related to duration in the first 
job. 
C. Gender 
Feinale employees are ofteii believed to liave highei iur~iovcr  rates 
than male employees (Cotton and Tuttle (1986)). Schwartz (1989), for 
example, found that top performing females have turnover rates that 
are nearly two and a half times that of their male counterparts. Simi- 
larly, Lewis and Park (1989) report that the percentage of quitting fe- 
male administrators and professionals in federal service is higher than 
that of males. On the other hand, Stumpf and Dawley (1981) found 
males to be more likely to leave than females in female-dominated 
nonprofessional occupations, and Flanders and Anderson (1973) and 
Hennig and Jardim (1977) found that female managers were more in- 
clined to have single-employer careers. 
A potential explanation for these conflicting findings lies in the 
sample-specific causes for quitting. Petersen and Spilerman (1990) found that women quit their company less often than men for career 
rcasons, but have a much higher quitting rate for personal reasons. 
Thus, if women often appear to have a lower job attachment than men, 
it is not that they move more from one employer to another, but be- 
cause they either quit the job-market to take care of the children or 
because they follow their husband after he has changed jobs.  Since 
we do not have firm priors on the importance of these family obliga- 
tions in our data set (i.e. shortly after graduation), we do not formu- 
late a directional hypothesis with respect to the impact of gender. 
Hypothesis 3: Gender will be related to dr~ratiorz  irz  the first job. 
D. Geographical Prefererzce 
Job mobility may also be a result of self-selection. The self-selection 
argument suggests that individuals, by choice, choose for a specific ca- 
reer path. Brett, Stroh and Reilly (1992) found that self-selection va- 
riables such as willingness to move, attitudes toward moving, number 
of times they turned down a transfer, and number of times their name 
was removed from consideration for a transfer accounted for a signi- 
ficant amount of the variance in both salary progression and geogra- 
phic mobility. Likewise, employees who were mobile before, conti- 
nue to be inore mobile (Lindeboom and Theeuwes (1991)). This stu- 
dy examines preference of job location as an indicator of  self-selec- 
tion, expecting that iildividuals with no specific geographical prefe- 
rence will leave their first employer sooner. 
Hypothesis 4: Having a specific geographical prefererzce  will be positi- 
vely related to one's d~~ration  in the first job. 
E. Career Vnl~les 
Workers enter jobs with different work and career values, which in- 
creases the heterogeneity of the work force (London and Stumpf (1986); 
Morris and Villemez (1992)). Since career-related variables describe 
the employee population, they may also bc important factors in turn- 
over and job-mobility research. Recent research found that the ma- 
jor factor predicting turnover for both male and female managers was 
their intent to leave, which was in turn predicted by attitudes about 
the job, company and career (Stroh, Brett and Reilly (1993)). Mana- 
gers who were satisfied with their jobs intended to stay longer, as did managers who were loyal to the organization. On the other hand, ma- 
nagers who were self loyal and willing to change companies for ca- 
reer advancement, were particularly likely to leave. 
This study examines the relation between duration in first job and 
four different career values: job initiative, job compensation, career 
advancement and organizational status'.  These career values repre- 
sent the young graduates' attitudes towards work and career when 
choosing their first job. While job initiative refers primarily to an in- 
trinsic motivational value to accept a job, job compensation, career 
advancement and status refer more to different components of  ex- 
trinsic motivational values. Since the influence of these career values 
on turnover is examined in an exploratory way, no directional hypo- 
theses are formulated. 
Hypothesis 5: Individ~~ai  career. vaiues wili affect the duration in the  first 
job. 
F.  Salary 
Salary is one of  the most salient job  characteristics related to turn- 
over. According to neoclassical labor market theory, an organization 
which offers high net advantages will have a more stable labor force 
than organizations which offer low net advantages as advantage-maxi- 
mizing employees seek employment elsewhere. Put differently, since 
salary level is one of the most measurable components of net advan- 
tage, individuais with high salaries are expected to have less incentive 
to move (McCall(1990)). For example, Curran (1981) found that em- 
ployees in industries with relatively low wages have a greater propen- 
sity to quit their job than those in industries with higher wages. The 
meta-analysis of Cotton and Tuttle (1986) co~lfirmed  the conclusion 
that actually-paid salaly is a stable, reliable predictor of turnover. 
Hypothesis 6: Salary will be  positively related to the duration in the  first 
job. 
The major indicator of type of organization we consider is their size 
as measured by their number of  employees. Previous research indi- 
cates that the size of  an orgzinization is related to its turnover rate. 
However, the direction of  this relation is not always clear (Mobley (1982); Terborg and Lee (1984)). Large organizations may have lo- 
wer turnover rates because of  greater iniernal mobility oppoltuni- 
ties, more sophisticated human resource management processes, more 
competitive compensatioll systems and more activities devoted to the 
management of turnover. Since the internal labor market is more ef- 
ficient, people will stay with the same company. Similarly, if  the re- 
wards within the organization are already quite high, it becomes less 
likely that the opportunities outside the company are more attractive 
(Petersen and Spiler~nan  (1990)). Howcver, one could also argue that 
large organizations may experience a higher turnover rate because of 
communication problems, poor group cohesion, impersonalization 
and bureaucratization. So, small organizations may have a lower turn- 
over rate since they may be regarded as having a more congenial wor- 
king atmosphere and more opportunities for initiative. Finally, there 
is some suggestioli that size might be curvilinearly related to turn- 
over with small and large organizations having the least turnover (Blue- 
dorn (1982)). 
The size of an organization may be a reasonable descriptor for pri- 
vate companies. However, several graduates in our sample had jobs 
in the governmental and educational sector, for which size is a less 
meaningful descriptor. For those categories, a separate dummy va- 
riable was introduced, but no a priori hypothesis on the sign of their 
coefficients (relative to the turnover rate in the largest private-com- 
pany category) was formulated. 
Hypothesis 7: The type (size) of company will be related to the duration 
in the first job. 
111.  DATA 
A.  Sample 
The sample consists of 704 youllg Belgian managers. They graduated 
in 1986 and 1987 from a Flemish university or industrial college. All 
of  them were employed for at least 24 months, although not neces- 
sarily with the same employer. The duration of interest in our analy- 
sis is their length of stay with their first employer. For those who had 
not yet switched jobs, the duration until the end of  the observation 
period (June 1990) was considered. As will be discussed in section IV, 
our modeling approach will explicitly account for this non-switching. Sixty six percent of them were male, 34 percent female. Their educa- 
tion degree was in business (22%), engineering (i8%  indubtrial engi- 
neering and 10% civil engineering), literature (16%), law (12%), hu- 
man sciences (11%), and exact sciences (11%). The  jobs covered most- 
ly administrative (19%), educational (18 %), research related (15%), 
commercial (14%) and technical (8%) functions. Other jobs were in 
information technology, production, personnel, and marketing. The 
industry in which they were employed was mainly education (16%), 
business services (12%), and baalcinlg and insul-ance (11%). 
B. Measurement 
Table 1  presents the different categories of  each explanatory varia- 
ble, and gives the number of  observations in each category. Except 
for career values, all variables were coded as dummy variables. 
Career values were measured by asking the respondents to rate the 
importance of 14 criteria in choosing their first job on a 5-point scale 
ranging from not at all important (=  1) to very important (=5). Con- 
TABLE l 
The categories of explanatory variables 
Explanatory Variable 
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2.29 firmatory factor analysis using Lisrel was used to examine the unidi- 
lnensionaiity of  the four career values iden~ified  (using exploratory 
factor analysis) in the original study of Ki.arzteng~oep  De Stnizdan1.d  (De 
Personeelsgids (1991)): job initiative, career advancement, job com- 
pensation, and status. After respecification, the measurement model 
included 12  items and provided an acceptable fit (C'  = 344.9, p < .001; 
GFI= .94). The items and their factor loadings in the confirmatory 
factor analysis are presented in Table 2. Subjects' scores on each ca- 
TABLE 2 
The measurement model of four career values 
Factor Loadings 
reer value were then computed as the weighted linear composite of 
the item scores (Steenkamp and van 2ijp (199ijj. 
Alpha 
Freedom to take initiative 
Having responsibility 
An entrepreneurial job 
Job with autonomy 
Career Advancement 
Opportunities for career advancement 
Opportunities for training 




Compensation on the basis of results 
Job Status 
Job with hiqgh personal status 
Job in a high status organization 
IV.  THE  MODELING APPROACH 
Job Initiative  I  I 
To test the hypotheses introduced in Section 11, one may be inclined 
to use a regression model with the number of months in the first job 
as dependent variable, and the respondents' gender, education le- 
vel, ... as explanatory variables. However, the distinct nature of our du- 
ration data makes this approach less appropriate.  First, 43 percent of 
the respondents were still in their first job at the end of the observa- 
tion period. As a consequence, their true length of stay before switching 
will only be knowll in the future. Such observations are called right 
















.G8 of dealing with censored observations is to ignore them, i.e. to limit 
the sanple to those respondents who have already left their first job 
and for which we know the actual length of stay. However, this would 
result in a significant loss of  illformation and would cause the para- 
meter estimates to be biased. Alternatively, one could use the obser- 
ved duration (i.e. until the end of the observation period) as a proxy 
for their unknown true duration, but this would again lead to biased 
and inconsistent parameter estimates (see e.g. Lancaster (1990)). Se- 
cond, if  one wants to assess the impact of tenure on turnover, the 
length of stay should be used as an explanatory rather than as dep- 
endent variable. Put differently, the nature of  the time dependence 
cannot be assessed with traditional regressions. Third, even when 
many potentially important moderating variables are included into the 
model, there may still be factors which are omitted from the model. 
For example, the amoullt of fringe benefits offered by the company, 
the distance between the company and the respondent's home, or the 
relationship with hislher co-workers may all have an impact on a young 
professional's propensity to quit, but no data on these factors were 
available in the data set. The omission of these potentially important 
factors may affect the included parameter estimates, but it is difficult 
to correct for an omitted-variable bias in a regression context3. 
One  way to deal with censored observations is to use a logit model, 
where the dependent variable can take on two values, 0 for those who 
have not yet quit their first job (the "stayers")  and 1  for those who have 
left (the "switchers").  From this logit estimation, one can asses what 
factors affect a respondent's probability of belonging to either cate- 
goly. However, this again results in a significant loss of information, 
since na distinction is made between someone who changed jobs after 
3 months and someone who switched after 3 years; both will be coded 
as "switchers".  As will be indicated in our empirical results section, 
this loss of information may have substantial implications when tes- 
ting our hypotheses. Also, it is still difficult to correct for unobserved 
heterogeneity and to assess the nature of the time dependence (see 
Gupta (1991) or Helsen and Schmittlein (1993) for a detailed discus- 
sion). 
The proposed framework will adequately deal with censored ob- 
servations, in that it will use all relevant information on those who have 
not yet left their first job. It will also allow us to quantify in a very flexi- 
ble way the nature of the time dependence, and will provide a correc- 
tion for unobserved heterogeneity. In what follows, we only present the spirit of the model, and refer to Vanhuele, Dekimpe, Sharma and 
Morrisoii (1895) for a detailed technical diszussioii. 
A.  The Base Model 
A central concept in our modeling approach is a respondent's ha- 
zard, i.e.  the conditional probability of changing jobs in period t given 
that one has not done so earlier. The form of the hazard function will 
reveal the impact of tenure (also called the nature of the time depen- 
dence) and will indicate, for example, whether someone who has been 
on the job for three years is more, less or equally likely to quit in the 
coming period than someone who has been on the job for only two 
years. 
The most simple starting point is to assume that there is no time 
dependence, i.e. irrespective of  how long a young professional has 
been on the job, heishe is equally likely to quit in the coming period. 
Technically, this is reflected in the assumption that the manager's du- 
ration has an exponential distribution. Indeed, for the exponential dis- 
tribution the probability density function f(t), cumulative distribu- 
tion function F(t), survival function S(t) and hazard function h(t) are 
given b< 
S(t;  A.)  =  1  -B;@;  A.)  =  g-h 
As shown in Equation (Id), the conditional probability of quit- 
ting (the hazard) is a constant, and therefore does not depend on the 
time the respondent has been with the company. 
To obtain an estimate of the parameter h,  we derive the (log) like- 
lihood function, which is subsequently maximized with respect to h. The contribution of  a respondent to the likelihood function is diffe- 
rent for completed and censored observations. The li~eiinood  of seeing 
a completed duration of  length ti is given by f(ti). However, to ac- 
coullt for the discrete nature of the data (we know in what month he/ 
she has quit the  job, but do not know the exact day within that month), 
we replace  f(ti) by the difference between the survival function at the 
beginning and end of the month. As such, the contribution becomes 
S(ti-l)-S(ti),  where the survivor function S(ti)=  l-F(ti) gives the pro- 
bability that manager i will stay at least li  periods. Consiclei-,  for examp- 
le, an exponential model where h equals 0.2.  Using equation (lc), S(1) 
can be computed as e-0.2  (= 0.82), and gives the probability that the 
manager stays at least one period. Similarly, S(2) (= e-2'0.2  = 0.67) 
gives the probability of staying at  least two periods with the company. 
The difference between these two probabilities (= 0.15) gives the (un- 
conditional) probability that the manager leaves during the second pe- 
riod. For a censored observation, the colltribution to the likelihood 
function is given by S(ti-l).  We therefore assume the censoring to oc- 
cur at the beginning of  the time interval [ti-l,ti).  Clearly, some as- 
sumption of this kind is needed given the discrete nature of our data. 
Note that this lilielihood contribution reflects all relevant informa- 
tion we have on this person, i.e. that heishe had not yet left after the 
observed number of periods. 
If we introduce a censoring dummy di  which takes the value of one 
in case of  a censored observation and zero otherwise, we can write 
the likelihood contribution of manager i as: 
If the managers' durations are exponentially distributed, and if we 
assume that they all have the same mean quitting rate A,  the log-like- 
lihood fuilction for a sample of hi  managers becomes: 
B.  Incorporating Observable Characteristics 
Thus far,  we have made the unrealistic assumption that all young pro- 
fessionals have the same (conditional) quitting probability. In this sec- 
tion, we relax that assumption, and allow graduates with different cha- 
racteristics to have different quitting rates. This will allow us to test most5 of the hypotheses discussed in Section 11. Following Vanhuele 
et al. (1995), we write the quitting rate of the ith manager asS 
Xi is a vector of explanatory variables, b is a vector of coefficients, 
and h,  is the quitting rate of  the base group which comprises those 
graduates for which all covariates are zero (see Table 1  for a descrip- 
tion of  the base category). How should one interpret the b-coeffi- 
cients? A positive coefficient implies that an increase in the value of 
the covariate increases the conditional probability of quitting in the 
next period relative to the base group (and thus reduces the expected 
length of stay). Moreover, after some algebra one can show that when 
the j-th covariate changes by one unit, the hazard function changes 
by [exp(b,)-l] '"00  percent. To derive the likelihood function (which 
is subsequently maximized with respect to h, and b), an expression for 
the survivor function associated with the hazard rate in equation (4) 
is needed. This expression is derived in Vanhuele et al. (1995), and 
we refer the interested reader to the original article for mathematical 
details. 
C. Modeling the Impact of  Tenure 
Even though in Section B we already allowed managers with diffe- 
rent observable characteristics io have a different quitting propensi- 
ty, we still assumed that the hazard did nor change over rime. To cap- 
ture the effect of tenure, we add a set of time-valying dummy varia- 
bles to equation (4). which becomes (Vanhuele et al. 1995) 
Theoretically, a separate dummy variable could be used for each 
month the manager has been in hislher first job. For example, the time- 
varying dummy associated with month 3 is always zero except during 
the third month when it takes the value of  one, and therefore be- 
comes (0 0 1  0 O... 0). Similarly, the variable associated with month 4 
becomes (0 0 0 1  0 O... 0). No dummy variable is included for the first 
month, since the joint estimation of hO  and c,  would result in identi- 
fication problems. h,  should therefore be interpreted as the quitting 
rate of the base group in the first month. Positive (negative) c-coef- 
ficients for the other months indicate a higher (lower) quitting pro- bability as compared to the first period. In our empirical application, 
we will not aliow for a different c parameter in every month, since this 
would consume too many degrees of  freedom. Instead, we will allow 
for a different c-parameter after 3, 6, 12, 18,24,  30 and 36 months. 
Intuitively, this approach can be interpreted as a piecewise appro- 
ximation to  an underlying, possibly very complex, hazard function de- 
scribing the natme of the time dependence. Note that we do not make 
any distributional assumptions on the form of  the time dependence, 
as opposed to the exponen~iai  inodel which implies no time depen- 
dence or the Weibull model used in Lindeboom and Theeuwes (1991) 
where only a monotonically increasing or decreasing time dependen- 
ce can be captured. We therefore refer to our approach as a non-pa- 
rametric estimation of the baseline hazard (which is the hazard of the 
base group). From a substantive point of view, its flexibility allows us 
to quantify the impact of tenure without imposing stringent and of- 
ten hard-to-justify a priori assumptions. From a statistical point of 
view, this method ensures the consistency of the parameter estimates 
even when the true underlying continuous hazard is unknown (Meyer, 
1986,1990). 
We again refer to Vanhuele et al. (1995) for a derivation of the sur- 
vivor function (which is then substituted into equation 2) associated 
with the hazard function in equation 5. 
D. Acco~~nting  for Unobserved Hete~ogeneity 
Some factors that affect a manager's propensity to quit may not be 
available in the data set at hand or may be hard to quantify. Not ac- 
counting for these omitted factors may cause (i)  a spurious negative 
duration dependence (i.e. the estimated c-parameters will be too small, 
which may lead to misleading inferences about the impact of tenure), 
and (2) will also cause the coefficients of the included covariates (which 
are used to test our hypotheses) to be biased and inconsistent (see 
Vanhuele et al. (1995) or Dekimpe and Degraeve (1995) for an ela- 
borate discussion on this issue). 
In a nutshell, we let h,  be distributed according to a certain mixing 
distribution. As such, even though all managers in the base group have 
then the same observable characteristics, they are still allowed to have 
a different quitting propensity. To derive the mean baseline hazard, 
we subsequently me the mean of the mixing distribution (where for 
mathematical convenience we use the gamma distribution). The in- terpretation of the c and b-coefficients is not affected by this opera- 
tion; they stiii reflect how the hazard shifts reiative to, respectiveiy, 
the first month and the base group managers. 
In the discussion of  the empirical results, we will present parame- 
ter estimates for a model with and without a correction for unobser- 
ved heterogeneity. As such, we will be able to clearly illustrate the 
downward bias on the estimated time dependence when not accoun- 
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-0.091 V.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSPON 
Maximum-likelihood estimates for the model with and without hete- 
rogeneity are given in Table 3. For compariso~l  purposes, we also pre- 
sent parameter estimates for the Inore fa~iiiliar  logit model. 
A. Tenure 
To  assess the impact of tenure, we plot in Figure 1  the baseline ha- 
FIGURE 1 
The rn~pact  of ten~l~e  on the hazard rate of young Flenl~sh  r~lanagers 
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zard. Remember that the baseline hazard gives the conditional quit- 
ting probability for managers in the base group (i.e. male graduates 
from an industrial college, withsilt an extra degree, with a specific geo- 
graphic preference, earning less than BF 45,000 as starting salary, wor- 
king in an international firm with more than 250 employees, and with 
a score of zero on the career values). For the other categories, the ha- 
zard is proportional to this graph, and is obtained by rnultiplyi~lg  the 
baseline hazard with exp[bX], wherexis  their vector of covariate va- 
lues. Two issues need to be emphasized with respect to Figure 1.  From 
a substantive point of view, we see that the nature of the time depen- 
dcnce is non-monotonic and increases in the first two years, after 
which a decrease in the quitting probability is observed. As such, our findings confirm the results of McCall(1990) who also found a non- 
moi~otonic  impact of  tenure. From a methodo~ogical  poiiit of view, 
Figure 1  clearly illustrates the downward bias on the estimated time 
dependence when not accounting for unobserved heterogeneity. Put 
differently, if  one does not explicitly correct for the fact that not all 
relevant factors can be included into the model, one  will seriously un- 
derestimate the employees' quitting probability, which may in turn 
have a negative impact on the reliability of aggregate turn-over plans. 
Also, the pattern of the time dependence in Figure 2 may be hard to 
capture with a parametric distributional form, which illustrates the 
desirability of  adopting the extremely flexible, non-parametric speci- 
fication. 
In contrast to hypothesis 2, the results showed no relation between 
first job mobility and education. Flemish managers with a university 
degree or with an additional education did not leave their first em- 
ployer sooner than those with a degree from an industrial college, or 
no additional education. Two phenomena may explain this disconfir- 
mation of our prior hypothesis. First, the hypothesis was based on hu- 
man-capital theory assuming an efficient external labor market. Our 
findings may be due to the fact that the internal labor market is an 
important factor in Belgium. Leaving one's job  may cause the job- 
specific expertise to become less useful, and correspond to a drop in 
their built-up human capital. Sec~i~d,  having a degree from an indus- 
trial college as opposed to a university degree, or the acquisition of a 
second degree, may not induce much difference in initial human ca- 
pital. Put differently, the entire sample is well educated, and the re- 
sulting variability along the human-capital dimension inay not be large 
enough to find significant differences for the education variable. 
The results also showed no relationship between gender and first job 
mobility (hypothesis 3). It is possible that gender differences with res- 
pect to turnover are not encountered in the early stages of one's ca- 
reer. de Pasquale and Eange (1971) also found that men and women 
were equally likely to move from one organization to another in the 
early years of  their careers. As suggested in Section IH,  one explana- 
tion may be that the female graduates in our sample had the same (lack of) family obligations as their male colleagues. An alternative expla- 
nation may be that in the beginnilig of their cateer men and women 
have similar work and career related experiences. Indeed, Miller and 
Wheeler (1992) and Stroh,  Brett and Reilly (1993) found that gender 
differences in turnover disappear after controlling for these experien- 
ces. In a recent study in The Nethei-lands,  Lindeboom and Theeuwes 
(1991) foulld that females are more mobile than males, but that the 
observed differences were partly due to males and females having dif- 
fering job characteristics (c.g. males work cn average 38 hours, whe- 
reas females work an average of  25 hours a week). In our sample of 
young professionals, we do not expect such dramatic differences to 
exist, which Inay explain why no significant differences in turnover 
were found alnong the two groups. 
Flemish managers with no preference for a specific job location were 
found to leave their first employer sooner than the base group. All 
else equal, the coilditional quitting probability of a manager who has 
no specific preference where to work is 39 percent higher than of  a 
manager who has a specific preference. This supports our hypothesis 
that geographical preference is an important self-selection variable 
in understanding the job mobility of Flemish managers. 
Our results show that Flemish managers who value job initiative more 
are iess likely to ieavt: tlieir first jab. Theri  wCrc na differences f~ur,d 
with respect to the stated importance of job compensation, career ad- 
vancement and job status. Young managers who chose their first job 
based on criteria like freedom to take initiative, opportunity to take 
responsibility,  and autonomy, had  a  lower  quitting probability 
(i.e. 4% = [exp (-,043)-1) 1001) than those who valued job initiative 
lower7. Other evaluation criteria like a good salary, a job with career 
advancement, and with high personal status had no impact on the du- 
ration in the first job. These results are consistent with Kraut's study 
(1975) in which attitude towards work was found to be significantly 
correlated with turnover but not attitude towards company, team work, 
advancement, pay and workload. The distinction between these two 
types of criteria seem to refer to intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. This explorative finding suggests that managers who are intrinsically mo- 
tivated are mole iikely to stay in their firsr job. 
We find that Flemish managers with a starting salary of more than BF 
60,000 are less likely to leave the organization than those with a sa- 
lary of less than BF 45,000. The former group's conditional quitting 
probability is 46 percent [exp (-.615)-1)";100]  Iower than that of  the 
base group. This finding supports the general conclusion that pay is a 
stable and reliable predictor of turnover. It is worth noting that even 
though the respondents' initial (and stated) interest in monetary corn- 
pensation turned out to be insignificant (cf. supra), that their nct~lal 
salary does affect their expected length of  stay. A further investiga- 
tion of this discrepancy is certainly an interesting area for future re- 
search. 
G. Type of  0r.ganization 
Flemish managers working in medium large organizations (51,250 em- 
ployees) have a 90 lexp(.647)-1) "OO]percent  higher quitting proba- 
bility than those working in a large, interilational organization. No dif- 
ferences in first job mobility were found between managers working 
in, respectively, the latter type of  organization and small organiza- 
tions with less than 51 employees8.  This finding provides support for 
a curvilinear relationship between turnover and size of the organiza- 
tion. Turnover is the highest in medium-sized organizations  which may 
not have the internal mobility opportunities of  a large organization 
nor the congenial working atmosphere and opportunities for initia- 
tive of a small organization. 
This study also showed that Flemish managers who started wor- 
king in a governmental and educational organization leave this orga- 
nization sooner than those in a large private organization. Their con- 
ditional quitting probability is respectively 58 percent and 66 percent 
higher than the base group. This finding indicates that first job mobi- 
lity in Belgium is higher in the public sector than in certain company 
types in the private sector. H.  The Quitting P~obability  of  Selected GIZ)LL~S 
To further illustrate how the quitting probability differs quite drama- 
tically among different categories, we plot in Figure 2 the hazard rate 
for two groups: (1) graduates who receive a starting salary of  more 
than BF 60,000 in a multinational firm, as opposed to (2) graduates 
who receive less than BF 45,000 in a medium-sized company (55-250 
employees). The graphs are obtained by multiplying the top graph in 
Figure 1  with exp(b,) where 6,  is the parameter estimate associated 
with, respectively, the salary or firm-type category. As such, we assume 
that on all other covariates (e.g. geographic preference, intrinsic mo- 
FIGURE 2 
The hazard rate of selected grorcps ofyoung Flemish managers 
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tivation), both groups have the same values as the base categoly. Ob- 
viously, one could also plot the graphs for other combinations of the 
different characteristics, and assess the (conditional) quitting proba- 
bility for different types of employees at different points in their ca- 
reer (i.e. for different levels of tenure). 
The results of these analyses can also be presented in terms of the 
survivor function. As illustrated in Table 4, 92% of the managers in 
group I stay for at least 3 months in their first job, while almost 25% 
of  the managers in groiip I1 have already switched jobs by that time9' TABLE 4 
The sui-viva1  probabilio for  selected groups ojyou~lg  flemzsi~  i~zanngers 
S (3 mol~tlis)  0.927  0.761 
S (6 months)  0.801  0.457 
S (12 months)  0.589  0.153 
S (l8 months)  0.400  0.039 
Notc  .  Group I  : > BF 60,000, > 250 Employees and International 
Group I1  : < BF 45,000,  51 - 250 Employees 
Group  I 
VH.  CONCLUSION 
Group  I1 
The probability that young Flemish managers leave their first emplo- 
yer during their initial employment period is influenced by the mana- 
gers' tenure with the firm, their geographical preference, the impor- 
tance they attach to job initiative, the actually paid salary, and the size 
of  the organization. In contrast, education, gender, the importance 
they attach to job compensation, career advancement and job status 
when choosing their first job, had no effect on the young managers' 
quitting rate. 
Flemish managers show an increasing quitting probability during 
the first two years of their employment  After these two years. their 
quitting rate starts to decrease. These findings could not have been 
obtained with traditional analyses such as regression or logit models. 
Moreover, Figure 2 clearly ~llustrated  that the time dependence in the 
managers' quitting propensity would be difficult to operationalize with 
a parametric distributional form, and would have been seriously un- 
der-estimated if  no allowance had been made for unobserved hetero- 
geneity. With respect to the other predictors, organizations selecting 
young graduates may first of  all want to focus on the geographic pre- 
ference of their candidates since this seems to be an important self- 
selection variable in understanding Flemish managers' job mobility. 
In addition, young graduates who have chosen their first job based on 
the intrinsic value of job initiative are more likely to stay longer with 
their first employer. However, once they have found a job, their actu- 
ally-paid salaly,  which is a major extrinsic motivator, also becomes an 
important determinant of  their expected length of  stay. Finally, rna- nagers working in medium-sized organizations are more likely to lea- 
ve the organizations than those working in large international or small 
organizations. They seem to lack the benefits of career opportunities 
in large organizations, as well as the greater autonomy and congenial 
atmosphere in many smaller organizations. These findings indicate the 
inlportance of assigning young graduates a challenging job, providing 
them with a career perspective, and creating a stimulating work envi- 
ronment. In taking such actions, organizations are likely to decrease 
the turnover of  rheir young managers. 
NOTES 
1. In this paper, turnover is defined as a change of employer. As such, internal promotions 
are not considered to be a job switch. 
2. The operationalizatioil of these concepts is discussed in more detail in Section 111. 
3.  In  what follows, we will refer to the fact that not all relevant factors are included as unob- 
served heterogeneity. This reflects the fact that responde~lts  differ in their quitting pro- 
pensity, and that not all underlying causes for these differences are observed by the mo- 
del builder. 
4. For notational convenience, we define monthly grouping intervals [t,.,,t,),  k = 1, 2,  ..., 
m+1, t,  = 0.  t,,,  = m, and record quitting in duration interval [t,-,,t,,) as t,.  It should be 
emphasized that the variable t does not refer to actual calendar time, but to the number 
of months in a respondent's first job. 
5. A test for the impact of tenure is discussed in Section IVC. 
6. The exponential function is used because it is quite flexible, and because it ensures the 
non-negativity of the hazard rate. 
7. Note that this covariate is not a dummy variable but has a contin~ious  scale. The  4% in- 
crease refers to the increase in the conditional quitting probability if  the value of  the 
respondent's factor score increases by one unit. 
8. Note that tliis result is in coiitrast with wliai ib iiilreiicd f1011i the pdid~iieicr  ebtil~lilteb  ill 
the logit model, which indicates that the information loss in the latter may affect the 
concl~rsioris  of the analysis. 
9. The figures in Table 4 are easily derived using the following relationship between the 
survivor and hazard function: Si(t) = exp[-(l.,,, +hi,z+...+h'.t)]  where h,,, is the hazard 
of manager i in period j (see Vanhuele et al. (1995) for more details). 
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